Complex networks such as the sexual partnership web or the Internet often show a high degree of redundancy and heterogeneity in their connectivity properties. This peculiar connectivity, however, provides an ideal environment for the spreading of biological or digital infective agents. Here we show that the random uniform immunisation of individuals does not lead to the eradication of infections in all complex networks. Namely, networks with scale-free properties do not acquire global immunity from major epidemic outbreaks even in the presence of unrealistically high densities of randomly immunised individuals. The absence of any critical immunisation threshold is due to the unbounded connectivity fluctuations of scale-free networks.
INTRODUCTION
The relevance of spatial and other kinds of heterogeneity in the design of immunisation programmes has been widely addressed in the epidemic modelling of infectious diseases (Hethcote, 1978; May & Anderson, 1984; Anderson & May, 1992; Diekmann & Heesterbeek, 2000) . In particular, it has been pointed out that inhomogeneities can substantially enhance the spread of diseases making them harder to eradicate and calling for specific immunisation strategies. This issue assumes the greatest importance in a wide range of natural interconnected systems such as food-webs, communication and social networks, metabolic and neural systems (Amaral et al., 2000; Strogatz, 2001) . The complexity of these networks resides in the small average path lengths among any two nodes (small-world property), along with a large degree of local clustering. In other words, some special nodes of the structure develop a larger probability to establish connections pointing to other nodes. This feature has dramatic consequences in the topology of scale-free (SF) networks Faloutsos et al., 1999; Dorogovtsev et al., 2000) which exhibit a power-law distribution, P (k) ∼ k −γ , for the probability that any node has k connections to other nodes. For exponents in the range 2 < γ ≤ 3, this connectivity distribution implies that the nodes have a statistically significant probability of having a very large number of connections compared to the average connectivity, k . This feature opposes to regular networks (local or nonlocal) in which each node has approximately the same number of links, k ≃ k (Erdös & Rényi, 1960; Watts & Strogatz, 1998) . The extreme heterogeneity of SF networks finds the most stunning examples in two artificial systems such as the World-Wide-Web (WWW) Albert et al., 1999) and the Internet (Faloutsos et al., 1999; Caldarelli et al., 2000) . Along with these technological networks, it has also been pointed out that sexual partnership networks are often extremely heterogeneous (Hethcote & Yorke, 1984; May & Anderson, 1987; Anderson & May, 1992) , and it has been recently observed that the network of sexual human contacts possesses a well-defined scale-free nature (Liljeros et al., 2001) .
In highly heterogeneous networks, the basic reproductive ratio of the infections increases with the standard deviation of the connectivity distribution (for a review see (Anderson & May, 1992) ). This feature is paradoxically amplified in scale-free networks which have diverging connectivity fluctuations. In fact, in regular networks, an epidemic occurs only if the rate of infection of "healthy" individuals connected to infected ones exceeds the socalled epidemic threshold; in other words, if the disease cannot transmit itself faster than the time of cure, it dies out (Anderson & May, 1992; Diekmann & Heesterbeek, 2000) . On the contrary, it has been recently shown (Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2001a; Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2001b ) that on SF networks (for instance, in the digital world), epidemic processes do not posses an epidemic threshold below which diseases cannot produce a major epidemic outbreak or the inset of an endemic state. SF networks are therefore prone to the spreading and the persistence of infections, whatever virulence the infective agent might possess.
In view of this weakness, it becomes a major task to find optimal immunisation procedures oriented to minimise the risk of epidemic outbreaks on SF networks, task with immediate practical and economical implications. This paper presents a parallel comparison of the effect of different immunisation programmes in the case of two different complex networks: the Watts-Strogatz (WS) model (Watts & Strogatz, 1998) and the Barabási and Albert (BA) model . The first model is a small-world network with bounded connectivity fluctuations, while the second one is the prototype example of SF network. By studying the susceptible-infected-susceptible model in presence of progressively high immunisation rates, we find that uniformly applied immunisation programmes are effective only in complex networks with bounded connectivity fluctuations. On the contrary, in SF networks the infection is not eradicated even in the presence of an unrealistically high fraction of immunised individuals. Actually, SF systems do not have any critical fraction of immunised individuals and only the total immunisation of the network achieves the infection's eradication. This is the limiting case for systems where a larger
proportion of the population must be vaccinated depending on the increasing heterogeneity (Anderson & May, 1992) . In order to overcome these difficulties we define optimal immunisation strategies that rely on the particular SF structure of the network. The developed programme allows us to achieve the total protection of the network even for extremely low fractions of successfully immunised individuals.
THE MODEL
In order to estimate the effect of an increasing density of immune individuals in complex networks, we will investigate the standard susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model (Diekmann & Heesterbeek, 2000) . This model relies on a coarse-grained description of individuals in the population. Namely, each node of the graph represents an individual and each link is a connection along which the infection can spread. Each susceptible (healthy) node is infected with rate ν if it is connected to one or more infected nodes. Infected nodes are cured and become again susceptible with rate δ, defining an effective spreading rate λ = ν/δ (without lack of generality, we set δ = 1.). The SIS model does not take into account the possibility of individuals removal due to death or acquired immunisation (Diekmann & Heesterbeek, 2000) . The equation describing the time evolution of the average density of infected individuals ρ(t) (prevalence) at the mean-field level is
The mean-field character of this equation stems from the fact that we have neglected the density correlations among the different nodes, independently of their respective connectivities. The first term on the r.h.s. in Eq.
(1) considers infected nodes becoming healthy with unit rate. The second term represents the average density of newly infected nodes generated by each active node. This is proportional to the infection spreading rate λ, the number of links emanating from each node, and the probability that a given link points to a healthy node, [1 − ρ(t)]. In models with exponentially bounded connectivity fluctuations, such as Euclidean lattices, random graphs (Erdös & Rényi, 1960 ) and the WS model (Watts & Strogatz, 1998) , one can consider that each node has roughly the same number of links, k ≃ k . This is equivalent to an homogeneity assumption for the system's connectivity. After imposing the stationary condition dρ(t)/dt = 0, the most significant and general result is the existence of a nonzero epidemic threshold λ c = k −1 (Diekmann & Heesterbeek, 2000) such that
In other words, if the value of λ is above the threshold, λ ≥ λ c , the infection spreads and becomes endemic. Below it, λ < λ c , the infection dies out exponentially fast. The existence of an epidemic threshold is a general results in epidemic modelling, present also in different models such as the susceptible-infected-removed (SIR) model (Diekmann & Heesterbeek, 2000) . The threshold mechanism is related to the basic reproductive rate R 0 ∼ λ k usually considered by epidemiologist. Only if R 0 is larger than unity the infection can sustain itself, obviously defining a threshold in the spreading rate λ (Diekmann & Heesterbeek, 2000) .
The standard framework is radically changed in the case of SF networks (PastorSatorras & Vespignani, 2001a; Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2001b) . In SF networks the probability distribution that a node has k connections has the form P (k) ∼ k −γ and the connectivity fluctuations k 2 diverge for any value 2 < γ ≤ 3. For this class of graphs, in fact, the absence of a characteristic scale for the connectivity makes highly connected nodes statistically significant, and induces strong fluctuations in the connectivity distribution which cannot be neglected. In order to take into account these fluctuations, we have to relax the homogeneity assumption used for exponential networks, and consider the relative density ρ k (t) of infected nodes with given connectivity k; i.e., the probability that a node with k links is infected. The dynamical mean-field equations can thus be written
where also in this case we have considered a unity recovery rate. The creation term considers the probability that a node with k links is healthy [1 − ρ k (t)] and gets the infection via a connected node. The probability of this last event is proportional to the infection rate λ, the number of connections k, and the probability Θ(ρ(t)) that any given link points to an infected node. The probability that a link points to a node with s links is proportional to sP (s). In other words, a randomly chosen link is more likely to be connected to an infected node with high connectivity, yielding the relation
where s sP (s) is identical to k by definition. Since in the stationary state [dρ k (t)/dt = 0]
we obtain the self-consistency equation ( 
where Θ is now a function of λ alone. The solution Θ = 0 is always satisfying the consistency equation. A non-zero stationary prevalence (ρ k = 0) is obtained when the r.h.s. and the l.h.s. of Eq. (7), expressed as function of Θ, cross in the interval 0 < Θ ≤ 1 allowing a nontrivial solution. It is easy to realise that this corresponds to the inequality
being satisfied, defining the critical epidemic threshold
This results implies that in SF networks with connectivity exponent 2 < γ ≤ 3, for which 
where C is a constant. The absence of any epidemic threshold in this network can be understood by noticing that in heterogeneous systems the basic reproductive number R 0 contains a correction term linearly dependent on the fluctuations (standard deviation) of the nodes' connectivity distribution (Anderson & May, 1992; Diekmann & Heesterbeek, 2000) . In SF networks the divergence of the connectivity fluctuations leads to an R 0 that always exceeds unity whatever the spreading rate λ is. This ensures that epidemics always have a finite probability to survive indefinitely.
UNIFORM IMMUNISATION PROGRAMME
The simplest immunisation procedure one can consider consists in the random introduction of immune individuals in the population (Anderson & May, 1992) . Immune nodes cannot become infected and thus do not transmit the infection to their neighbours. In this case, for a fixed spreading rate λ, the relevant control parameter is the immunity g, defined as the fraction of immune nodes present in the network. The random immunisation scheme is implemented by randomly selecting and immunising a number gN of nodes in the graph, where N is the network size. At the mean-field level, the presence of random immunity will effectively reduce the spreading rate λ by a factor (1−g); i.e. the probability of finding and infecting a susceptible and non-immune node. By substituting λ → λ(1 − g) in Eqs. (1) and (4) we obtain the prevalence behaviour for progressively larger immunisation rates.
In exponentially bounded networks, such as the random graph and the WS model, it is easy to show that in the case of a constant λ, the prevalence is given by
where g c is a critical immunisation value above which the density of infected individuals in the stationary state is null. The critical immunisation which achieves eradication is related to the spreading rate and the epidemic threshold of the infection as g c = (λ − λ c )/λ. This equation is obviously valid only for λ > λ c , and implies that the critical immunisation allowing the complete protection of the network (null prevalence) is increasing with the spreading rate λ.
On the contrary, uniform immunisation programmes on SF networks are totally ineffective. The presence of immunisation depresses the infection's prevalence slowly, and it is impossible to find any critical fraction of immunised individuals that ensures the infection eradication. In fact, the absence of an epidemic threshold (λ c = 0) implies that whatever rescaling λ → λ(1 − g) of the spreading rate does not eradicate the infection except the case g = 1. This fact clearly points out that only a complete immunisation of the network ensures an infection-free stationary state. The fact that uniform immunisation strategies are less effective has been noted in several cases of spatial heterogeneity (Anderson & May, 1992) . In SF networks we face a limiting case due to the extremely high (virtually infinite) heterogeneity in connectivity properties.
In order to provide further support to the present mean-field (sometimes called the deterministic approximation) description of the SIS model, we study by means of numerical simulations the behaviour of the SIS model on the WS and the BA scale-free networks.
In these systems, because of the nonlocal connectivity, mean-field predictions are expected to correctly depict the model's behaviour. The WS model is constructed as follows: The starting point is a ring with N nodes, in which each node is symmetrically connected with its 2K nearest neighbours. Then, for every node each link connected to a clockwise neighbour is rewired to a randomly chosen node with probability p, and preserved with probability 1−p. This procedure generates a random graph with a connectivity distributed exponentially for large k, and an average connectivity k = 2K. We work with the parameter K = 3 and maximal disorder p = 1. As a paradigmatic SF network we use the BA graph, generated using the algorithm devised in . The construction of the BA graph starts from a small number m 0 of disconnected nodes; every time step a new vertex is added, with m links that are connected to an old node i with probability Π(k i ) = k i / j k j , where k i is the connectivity of the i-th node. After iterating this scheme a sufficient number of times, we obtain a network composed by N nodes with connectivity distribution P (k) ∼ k −3 and average connectivity k = 2m. In this work we consider the parameters m 0 = 5 and m = 3.
In the presence of immunisation, we can study the system by looking at the infection's prevalence in the stationary regime (endemic state) as a function of the immunity. Our simulations are implemented at a fixed spreading rate λ = 0.25. The number of nodes ranges from N = 10 4 to N = 10 6 . We analyse the stationary properties of the density of infected nodes ρ g (the infection prevalence) for different values of the immunisation g.
Initially we infect half of the susceptible nodes in the network, and iterate the rules of the SIS model with parallel updating. The prevalence is computed averaging over at least 100 different starting configurations, performed on at least 10 different realisation of the random network. In Fig. 1A , we show the behaviour of the reduced prevalence ρ g /ρ 0 (where ρ 0 is the prevalence without immunisation) as a function of the random immunisation g in the WS network. We observe that the prevalence of infected nodes decays drastically for increasing immunisation densities (see Fig. 1B ). In particular, we observe the presence of a sharp immunisation threshold g c ≃ 0.385, above which the prevalence is null, and it is impossible to reach an endemic state. In the biological case, this effect motivates the use of global vaccination campaigns in order to reach a density of immune individuals that secures from major outbreaks or endemic states. On the contrary, the results for the SF network, depicted in Fig. 2A , show a strikingly different behaviour. Namely, the density of infected individuals decays slowly with increasing immunisation, and it would be null only for the complete immunisation of the whole network (g = 1). Specifically, it follows from Eq. (10) that the SIS model on the BA network shows (for g ≃ 1) the prevalence
where C is a constant. We have checked this prediction in Fig.   2B . In other words, the infection always reaches an endemic state (see Fig.2C ). This points out the absence of an immunisation threshold; SF networks are weak in face of infections, also after massive uniform vaccination campaigns.
OPTIMAL IMMUNISATION PROGRAMME
When fighting an epidemic in an heterogeneous population with a uniform vaccination programme, it is necessary to vaccinate a fraction of the population larger than the estimate given by a simple (homogeneous) assumption (Hethcote, 1978; May & Anderson, 1984) . In this case, it can be proved (Anderson & May, 1992 ) that optimal vaccination programmes can eradicate the disease vaccinating a smaller number of individuals. SF networks can be considered as a limiting case of heterogeneous systems and it is natural to look for specifically devised immunisation strategies.
A straightforward way to reintroduce an immunisation threshold in SF networks consists in using different immunised fractions of individuals according to their connectivity. Let us define as (1 − g k ) ≡ q k the proportion of nonimmune individuals with a given connectivity k. If we impose thatλ
we obtain that Eqs. (4) become identical, defining effectively an homogeneous system.
The density of infected individuals is the same for all connectivities k, and an epidemic thresholdλ = 1 is reintroduced in the system. This condition requires that kq k is constant for all groups of connectivity k, implying that q k ∼ k −1 ; i.e., a larger portion of individuals is immunised in groups with greater connectivity. In this scheme the total density of immunised individuals can be easily calculated by averaging g k over the various connectivity classes. The fraction of non immunised individuals q k can not be greater than one, thus we focus only on classes with connectivity such that the reproductive number λk > 1. To eradicate the infection, we need that q k ≤ 1/kλ in all classes with connectivity k > λ −1 , defining the critical fraction of immunised individuals as
In order to perform an explicit calculation for the BA model, we use a continuous k approximation that allows the practical substitution of series with integrals . The full connectivity distribution is given by P (k) = 2m 2 k −3 , where m is the minimum number of connection at each node. In this case we obtain that
The result can be readily extended to arbitrary γ values, and it is worth remarking that this recipe is very similar to those introduced in the immunisation of heterogeneously populated groups (Anderson & May, 1992) .
While this immunisation programme is effective in finally introducing an immunisation threshold, the very peculiar nature of SF networks allows us to find more efficient strategies based on the nodes' hierarchy. In particular, it has been shown that SF networks posses a noticeable resilience to connection failures (Albert et al., 2000; Callaway et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2001) , which implies that the network can resist a high level of damage (disconnected links), without loosing its global connectivity properties; i.e., the possibility to find a connected path between almost any two nodes in the system. At the same time, SF networks are strongly affected by selective damage; if a few of the most connected nodes fail, the network suffers a dramatic reduction of its ability to carry information (Albert et al., 2000; Callaway et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2001) . Applying this argument to the case of epidemic spreading, we can devise a targeted immunisation scheme in which we progressively make immune the most highly connected nodes, i.e., the ones more likely to spread the disease. While this strategy is the simplest solution to the optimal immunisation problem in heterogeneous populations (Anderson & May, 1992) , its efficiency is comparable to others strategies in networks with finite connectivity variance. In SF networks, on the contrary, it produces an arresting increase of the network tolerance to infections at the price of a tiny fraction of immune individuals.
Let us consider the situation in which a fraction g of the individuals with the highest connectivity are successfully immunised. This corresponds to introduce an upper cut-off k c in the connectivity distribution that is related to the fraction of immunised individuals
The presence of the cut-off k c (g) defines the new average quantities k c = emanating from immunised individuals can be considered as if they were removed. The probability p(g) that any link will lead to an immunised individual is then given by
and if we consider that this fraction p(g) of links are effectively removed, the new connectivity distribution after the immunisation of a fraction g of the most connected individuals is (Cohen et al., 2001) :
The new distribution (after cut-off introduction and links removal) gives et al., 2001) . By recalling Eq. (9), the critical fraction of immune individuals needed to eradicate the infection will be given by the relation
An explicit calculation for the BA network with γ = 3 in the continuous k approximation gives k c = mg −1/2 and p(g) = g 1/2 . By inserting this value in the above calculation we obtain the approximate solution for small λ
This clearly indicates that the targeted immunisation programme is extremely convenient in the SF case where the critical immunisation is exponentially small in a wide range of spreading rates λ. Also in this case, the present result can be generalised for arbitrary connectivity exponents γ.
In order to test the targeted immunisation programme we have implemented numerical simulations of the SIS model on the WS and BA networks by immunising the gN nodes with the highest connectivity. Note that, for a given network, this method is essentially deterministic: Once we identify the hierarchy in the node's connectivity distribution, we proceed to protect those nodes on top of the list. In Fig. 1A we report the behaviour of the prevalence of infected nodes for the WS network with targeted immunisation; the results corresponding to the BA graph are plotted in Fig. 2A . In the case of the WS network, the behaviour of the prevalence as a function of g is equivalent to the random immunisation procedure. The connectivity fluctuations are small, and the immunisation of the most connected nodes is equivalent to the random choice of immune nodes. This confirms that targeted strategies do not have a particular efficiency in systems with limited heterogeneity. On the contrary, in the case of the BA network, we observe a drastic variation in the prevalence behaviour. In particular, the prevalence suffers a very sharp drop and exhibits the onset of an immunisation threshold above which no endemic state is possible (zero infected individuals). A linear extrapolation from the largest values of g yields an estimate of the very convenient threshold g c ≃ 0.16. This definitely shows that SF networks are highly sensitive to the targeted immunisation of a small fraction of nodes.
While these networks are particularly weak in face of infections, the good news consist in the possibility to devise immunisation strategies which are extremely effective.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The present results indicate that the SF networks' susceptibility to epidemic spreading is reflected also in an intrinsic difficulty in protecting them with local-randomimmunisation. On a global level, random immunisation policies are not satisfactory and, in analogy with disease spreading in heterogenous media, only targeted immunisation procedures achieve the desired lowering of epidemic outbreaks and prevalence. This evidence radically changes the usual perspective of the regular epidemiological framework. Spreading of infectious or polluting agents on SF networks, such as food or social webs, might be contrasted only by a careful choice of the immunisation procedure. In particular, these procedures should rely on the identification of the most connected individuals. The protection of just a tiny fraction of these individuals raises dramatically the tolerance to infections of the whole population A practical example is provided by the spreading of viruses in the Internet (Kephart et al., 1993) . The SF nature of this network is the outcome of a connectivity redundancy which is very welcome because it ensures a greater error tolerance than in less connected networks. On the other hand, despite the large use of anti-virus software which is available on the market within days or weeks after the first incident report, the average lifetime of digital epidemics are impressively large (10-14 months) (Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2001a) . Numerical simulations of the SIS model on real maps of the Internet can provide further support to our picture. The SIS model is, in fact, well suited to describe DNS-cache computer viruses (Bellovin, 1993 ) (the so-called "natural computer viruses"), and different digital viruses can be modelled by considering the random neighbour version of the model (Marro & Dickman, 1999) ); i.e. e-mails can be sent to different nodes which are not nearest neighbours. The map considered, provided by the National Laboratory for Applied Network Research (NLANR) and available at the web site http://www.moat.nlanr.net-/Routing/rawdata/, contains 6313 nodes and 12362 links, corresponding to an average connectivity k = 3.916. The connectivity distribution is scale-free, with a characteristic exponent γ ≃ 2.2. Our simulations are performed at a fixed spreading rate λ = 0.25, averaging over at least 2500 different starting configurations. We implement both the random and the targeted immunisation procedures. The results obtained clearly indicate that the behaviour is completely analogous to that found on the BA network. Fig. 3 illustrates that, while random immunisation does not allow any drastic reduction of the infection prevalence-the immunisation of 25% of the nodes reduces by less than a factor 1/2 the relative prevalence-the targeted immunisation drastically removes the occurrence of endemic states even at very low value of the immunisation parameter. The fact that SF networks can be properly secured only by a selective immunisation, points out that an optimised immunisation of the Internet can be reached only through a global immunisation organisation that secures a small set of selected high-traffic routers or Internet domains.
Unfortunately, the self-organised nature of the Internet does not allow to figure out easily how such an organisation should operate.
The presented results also appear to have potentially interesting implications in the case of human sexual disease control (Lloyd & May, 2001 ). Most sexually transmitted diseases cannot be characterised without including the noticeable differences of sexual activity within a given population. Epidemic modelling is thus based on partitioning population groups by the number of sexual partners per unit time (Hethcote & Yorke, 1984; May & Anderson, 1987; May & Anderson, 1988; Anderson & May, 1992) . This implicitly corresponds to the knowledge of the probability distribution function P (k) that gives the fraction of the population within the k class. The recent observation that the web of human sexual contacts exhibits scale-free features (Liljeros et al., 2001 ) points out that also sexually transmitted diseases are eventually spreading in a network with virtually infinite heterogeneity. It follows that concepts such as the mean number of sexual partners or its variance are not good indicators in this case. As well, the definition of a core group of "superspreader" individuals could be a non well-defined concept because of the lack of precisely defined thresholds or characteristic magnitudes in the scale-free distribution of sexual contacts. Nevertheless, the striking effectiveness of targeted immunisation indicates that control and prevention campaigns should be strongly focused at the most promiscuous individuals. These represent the most connected nodes of the network and are thus the key individuals in the spreading of the infection.
While the simple SIS model is very instructive, many other ingredients should be considered in a more realistic representation of real epidemics (Anderson & May, 1992; Diekmann & Heesterbeek, 2000) . One would also want to add simple rules defining the temporal pat- 
